Abstract-Formal analyses of blockchain protocols have received much attention recently. Consistency results of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol are often expressed in a quantity c, which denotes the expected number of network delays before some block is mined. With µ (resp., ν) denoting the fraction of computational power controlled by benign miners (resp., the adversary), where µ+ν = 1, we prove for the first time that to ensure the consistency property of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol in an asynchronous network, it suffices to have c to be just slightly greater than
I. INTRODUCTION
Nakamoto's blockchain protocol [1] supports the Bitcoin application and relies on the proof of work (POW). POW means that to create a block, a player needs to provide a solution of a cryptographic puzzle based on hash functions. Formal analyses of the protocol have received considerable interest recently [2] - [5] .
Garay, Kiayas and Leonardos [2] propose the first formal modeling for Nakamoto's blockchain protocol. They also identify conditions which enable Nakamoto's protocol to achieve a common prefix-property, where honest players' blockchain views have a large common prefix.
The model of [2] assumes a synchronous network. Removing such a strong assumption, Pass, Seeman, and Shelat [3] consider an asynchronous network by allowing the adversary to adaptively and individually delay messages up to a delay limit ∆. We refer to this as the ∆-delay model.
One of the desired properties in a blockchain protocol is consistency. In this paper, we follow [3] , [6] to define consistency as the property that for any positive integer T , with overwhelming probability in T , for any two rounds r and s with r < s, all but the last T blocks in the chain of any honest player i at round r is a prefix of the chain of any honest player j at round s. For an event to have an overwhelming probability in T , the probability of its complementary event should decay at least exponentially with respect to T .
Consistency results of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol are typically expressed in a quantity c defined as [3] by Pass, Seeman, and Shelat (PSS) in Eurocrypt 2017. We adopt n = 10 5 and ∆ = 10 13 from Figure 1 of [3] . c denoting 1 pn∆ roughly means the expected number of network delays before some block is mined. See Table I on Page 2 for the meanings of the notation.
denotes the hardness of the proof of work, n is the number of players, and ∆ is the maximum delay of a message by the adversary (the notation will be summarized in Table I on Page 2). Roughly speaking, c means the expected number of network delays before some block is mined.
In this paper, we present a result for the consistency property of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol. Our result is stronger than all existing results in the literature. Under the ∆-delay model, with µ (resp., ν) denoting the fraction of computational power controlled by benign miners (resp., the adversary), where µ + ν = 1 and 0 < ν < µ, we show that it suffices to achieve consistency for c denoting 1 pn∆ to be just slightly greater than 2µ ln(µ/ν) . Our work is the first one in the literature to derive such a neat expression 2µ ln(µ/ν) . Moreover, we will explain the superiority of our consistency result over existing results.
In the proof, we formulate two novel Markov chains. With a state of a round characterizing the number of mined blocks (e.g., no, one, or over one mined block), our first Markov chain models the transition of a variable denoting the suffix of the concatenation of the previous states and the current state. Our second Markov chain models the transition of a variable which denotes the concatenation of i) the suffix of previous states before the ∆ to last state, ii) the previous ∆ states, and iii) the current state.
We compare our consistency result with [3] and use Figure 1 on Page 1 to illustrate the comparison. We use n = 10 5 and ∆ = 10
13 from Figure 1 of [3] . We plot the allowed maximum value for the fraction ν of computational power controlled by the adversary with respect to c, the expected number of network delays before some block is mined, in order to not break consistency.
The magenta line of Figure 1 shows our consistency result. From the condition c > , our maximal ν max can be solved numerically given c (strictly speaking, ν max cannot be achieved due to the strict inequality sign). This gives the magenta line.
The blue line of Figure 1 is from the consistency analysis of [3] . The consistency condition of [3] The red line of Figure 1 illustrates an attack of [3] which breaks consistency. Remark 8.5 of [3] presents an attack which works when From Figure 1 , the magenta line illustrating our consistency result is strictly above the blue line for consistency of [3] . Hence, our consistency result is much stronger than that of [3] in the sense that our result tolerates much more fraction of adversarial computational power. A future direction is to see whether it is possible to reduce the gap between the magenta line for our consistency result and the red line representing an attack on consistency from [3] .
Organization of this paper. In Section II, we survey related studies. Section III explains the model for Nakamoto's blockchain protocol. Section IV presents our results for the consistency property of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol. In Sections V and VI, we provide the proof of Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. We conclude the paper in Section VII. Additional proof details are given in the Appendix.
Notation. Table I lists the notation and their meanings.
II. RELATED WORK
The essence of blockchain is a consensus protocol to achieve agreement among distributed nodes. The seminal blockchain protocol by Nakamoto [1] leads to the popular application of Bitcoin. Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency whose ledger is maintained by the public instead of trusted authorities. pn∆ . Roughly speaking, c means the expected number of ∆-delays before some block is mined. µ the fraction of computational power controlled by benign miners (i.e., the fraction of benign miners) ν the fraction of computational power controlled by the adversary (i.e., the fraction of corrupted miners) α α denotes the probability that some honest miner succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
α α denotes the probability that no honest miner succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
α 1 denotes the probability that only one honest miner succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
Nakamoto's blockchain protocol is built on the proof of work (POW) [1] . When a node creates a block, the node should provide a solution of a cryptographic puzzle based on hash functions. Every node maintains its own chain and accepts the longest chain of the ones it receives from the network.
Recently, formal analyses of blockchain protocols have received considerable attention [2] - [5] . Three commonly analyzed properties are consistency, chain growth, and chain quality.
In [1] , [2] , consistency is defined as the property that with overwhelming probability in T , at any round, the chains of two honest players can differ only in the last T blocks. Pass, Seeman, and Shelat [3] identify that this definition is not sufficient for consensus, since it does not exclude a protocol which oscillates between different chains. Hence, they require an additional property, referred to as future self-consistence: with overwhelming probability in T , at any two rounds r and s, the chains of any honest player at r and s differs only in blocks within the last T blocks. The consistency notion used in [6] and our current paper combines the consistency definition of [1] , [2] and future self-consistence of [3] . Specifically, by consistency, we mean that with overwhelming probability in T , for any two rounds r and s with r < s, all but the last T blocks in the chain of any honest player i at round r is a prefix of the chain of any honest player j at round s.
In addition to consistency analyzed by [1] - [3] , [6] , chain growth and chain quality for Nakamoto's blockchain protocol are also studied in the literature [3] , [4] , [7] - [9] . The chain growth is at least g if with overwhelming probability in T , the chain of honest players grew by at least T blocks in the last T /g rounds. The chain quality is at least q if with overwhelming probability in T , for any T consecutive blocks in any chain held by some honest player, the fraction of blocks contributed by honest players is at least q. In this paper, we analyze only consistency. A future direction is to investigate how to use our proof methods for the analyses of chain growth and chain quality.
After POW, blockchain protocols based on an alternative paradigm called the Proof of Stake (POS) have also been proposed [10] - [13] . POS typically consumes less computation power than POW. The ingenious Algorand protocol [14] combines POS and the classical practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) protocol of [15] . We refer interested readers to recent surveys [16] , [17] for more details of POW, POS, and other types of blockchain protocols.
III. THE MODEL FOR NAKAMOTO'S BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL
As in many blockchain studies, we adopt the formalization of Garay, Kiayas and Leonardos [2] and Pass, Seeman, and Shelat [3] for Nakamoto's blockchain protocol. We will mostly follow the notation of [6] , which presents a clear explanation of the formalization.
A blockchain is a pair of algorithms (Π, ext). The stateful algorithm Π maintains a local state variable C and also receives a security parameter κ as an input. The variable C is commonly referred to as the chain, since it contains a set of blocks. A block is an abstract record containing a message. The algorithm ext(κ, C) outputs an ordered sequence of messages.
The execution of a blockchain protocol (Π, ext) is directed by an environment Z(1 κ ). It activates each of n players as either honest or corrupt. All n players have identical computing power. Each honest player has a current view of the blockchain and aims to build blocks at the end of the chain. Each corrupted player is controlled by an adversary A. We consider that at any point, A can corrupt an honest party or uncorrupt a corrupted player, but the fraction of corrupted players is at most ν. For ease of analysis, we can just consider the worst case that A controls ν fraction of corrupted players at each round.
We consider the network to be asynchronous, and allow the adversary A to have the following capabilities:
① A can delay and/or reorder all messages up to a delay of ∆ rounds, but A cannot modify messages sent by honest players. ① A fully controls all corrupted players; i.e., A reads all their inputs/messages and sets their outputs/messages to be sent.
Strategies taken by the adversary A can be letting all corrupted players to work on the same block or different ones.
All players have access to a random function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} κ through the following two oracles. First, H(x) simply outputs H(x). Second, the verification oracle H.ver(x, y) outputs 1 if and only if H(x) = y and 0 otherwise. How H and H.ver can be accessed is specified as follows:
• In each round, the players, as well as the adversary A, make any number of queries to H.ver.
• In each round, each honest player can make only a single query H and the queries made by honest players are parallel so that even if they manage to mine several blocks, their longest chain can increase by at most 1. In contrast, the adversary A controlling q players can make q sequential queries to H.
The above model captures that we account for only the effort of finding a solution to a "proof of work", and consider that checking the validity of a solution is negligible. A "proof of work" given the block h −1 and message m is to find a string η such that H(h −1 , η, m) ≤ D p , where the blockchain protocol sets D p such that the probability of finding η to satisfy the above relation is p. This quantity p is referred to as the hardness of the proof of work.
Given the above, we now describe an execution of a blockchain protocol. At the beginning, the environment Z(1 κ ) instantiate n players, which have identical computing power. The protocol proceeds in rounds as follows. At each round, each player i does the following:
• i receives blocks created by other players and includes the blocks in its chain based on the protocol Π; • i can make at most one query to the oracle H and creates a block with probability p; and • i receives some message from Z(1 κ ) and includes the message in the block that i tries to publish, where the message contains transactions to be included in the blockchain.
As already noted, ν denotes the fraction of corrupted players controlled by the adversary. With µ being the fraction of honest players, we have
Throughout the paper, we enforce
and the trivial condition
From Eq. (1), Inequality (2) simply means the following two conditions:
i) the fraction of computational power controlled by benign miners is greater than that controlled by the adversary; and ii) the adversary controls non-zero fraction of computational power.
With n, p, µ, and ν introduced above, we now define α, α, and α 1 , which will be used in our theorems to be presented in Section IV. All these notation are given in Table I on Page 2. The meanings of α, α, and α 1 are as follows:
α : the probability that some honest miner, succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round, (4) α : the probability that no honest miner, succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round, (5) α 1 : the probability that only one honest miner, succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round.
Next, we derive the expressions of α, α, and α 1 . Since each honest node mines a block independently with probability p in a round, X denoting the number of blocks mined by the µn honest nodes in each round follows binom(µn, p), which denotes a binomial distribution with µn being the number of trials and p being the success probability for each trial. Hence, we have
IV. OUR RESULTS FOR THE CONSISTENCY PROPERTY OF NAKAMOTO'S BLOCKCHAIN PROTOCOL Our results for the consistency property of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol are presented as Theorems 1 and 2 below.
From [3] , [6] , blockchain consistency is defined as follows. O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) above decays at least exponentially with respect to T . Intuitively, the above consistency notion implies that there is at least 1 − O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) probability for the event that honest players agree on the current chain, except for T "unconfirmed" blocks at the end of the chain.
Based on Definition 1, Lemma 1 below presents a sufficient condition for consistency which we will use to prove our theorems. 
Lemma 1 (Blockchain consistency
where α (resp., α 1 ) denotes the probability that no (resp., only one) honest miner succeeds in solving a puzzle in one round, and is given by Eq. (8) (resp., Eq. (9)).
Theorem 2. Nakamoto's blockchain protocol satisfies consistency when there exist constants ǫ 1 and ǫ 2 satisfying 1 Given two positive sequences f T and g T indexed by T , we have
means that there exist positive constants c 1 and
To better understand Inequality (11) 
we can write Inequality (11) as
Remark 1. We now explain that Inequality (13) enforces c to be just slightly greater than 2µ ln(µ/ν) for ν satisfying Inequality (12) , which will be shown to cover most ν ∈ (0,
Here we consider ∆ = 10
13 which is used in Figure 1 of Pass et al. [3] , a seminal work on the consistency property of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol, but our discussions readily apply to other values of ∆. We consider two sets of δ 1 and δ 2 values which cover slightly different ranges of ν.
• For ∆ = 10 13 of [3] , we let δ 1 = 1 6 and δ 2 = 1 2 so that Inequalities (12) and (13) become
and
Inequalities (14) and (15) mean that c just needs to be slightly greater than 2µ ln(µ/ν) for 10 −63 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5 − 10 −7 , since the positive constant ǫ 2 in Inequality (15) can be arbitrarily small.
• Inequality (14) in the above case considers 10 −63 ≤ ν ≤ 0.5 − 10 −7 . Below we increase the upper bound for ν from 0.5−10 −7 in Inequality (14) to 0. (13) so that Inequalities (12) and (13) become
Inequalities (16) and (17) for most ν ∈ (0, 1 2 ).
Our paper is the first one in the literature to derive such a neat expression
Novelty of our Theorem 1. Our Theorem 1 is also novel in the sense its result as Inequality (10) has not been presented in any related work. Although a recent study by Kiffer et al. [6] also adopts a Markov-chain based approach that our Theorem 1 uses, our Theorem 1 differentiates from [6] in the following aspects as we will discuss:
• First, [6] does not use the following two Markov chains which we propose for the first time and use to prove our Theorem 1: ① a Markov chain which models the transition of a variable denoting the suffix of the concatenation of the previous states and the current state, ② a Markov chain modeling the transition of a variable which denotes the concatenation of i) the suffix of previous states before the ∆ to last state, ii) the previous ∆ states, and iii) the current state.
• Second, the analysis of [6] has minor errors and is more difficult to understand than our proof for Theorem 1. In [6] , the computations of ℓ 11 and ℓ 10 (defined on Page 7 of [6] ) are incorrect. Specifically,
• Third, [6] does not present the Inequality result (10) of our Theorem 1. A result given as Inequality (1) in [6] looks similar to our (10), but is incorrect due to the incorrect computations of ℓ 11 and ℓ 10 noted above. Also, the Markov chain in Figure 2 on Page 6 of [6] has only two states and cannot cover all possible states.
In addition, after obtaining an incorrect result similar to our (10), [6] does not analyze its result to provide a more understandable bound for c as our Theorem 2 does. Our proof of moving from Theorem 1 to Theorem 2 in Section VI is quite involved.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We will show in Section V-A that Inequality (10) of Theorem 1 is the same as
Here we discuss the intuition of requiring Inequality (18), which then gives Inequality (10). First, we will prove that the probability of C(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) being a constant factor smaller than its expectation E [C(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1)] is exponentially small in T . Formally, for any positive constant δ 2 < 1, we have
Second, we will prove that the probability of A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) being a constant factor greater than its expectation E [A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1)] is exponentially small in T . Formally, for any positive constant δ 3 , we have
In Inequalities (19) and (20), the term O(1) is with respect to T .
Via a union bound to combine Inequalities (19) and (20),
happens with probability no greater than the result of summing the bounds in the right hand side (RHS) of Inequalities (19) and (20) , which can also be written as O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )). Then we have (at least) 1 − O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )) probability for the above union event's complement,
From Inequality (18), we bound the term in (21) by
Then to obtain the desired result that
is Ω(T ) with probability 1 − O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )), we select positive constants δ 2 < 1 and δ 3 such that the term in (22) is Ω(T ). It will become clear from Eq. (27) that A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) can be written as Ω(T ), so we select positive constants δ 2 < 1 and (22) is a positive constant. To this end, we set
so that Inequality (22) becomes
Summarizing the above, we have If Inequalities (18) (19) and (20) hold, then
In the rest of this section, we will first prove in Sec-
The suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain C F , which models the transition of a variable denoting the suffix of the concatenation of the previous states and the current state.
tion V-A that Inequality (10) of Theorem 1 is the same as Inequality (18) . It will also become clear in Section V-A that A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) can be written as Ω(T ). Then we prove Inequalities (19) and (20) in Sections V-B and V-C. In Section V-D, we combine the results of Sections V-B and V-C with (25) to complete the proof of to Theorem 1.
A. Proving that Inequality (10) is the same as Inequality (18)
To show Inequality (18), we will explain
We first show Eq. (27). Since the adversary controls νn nodes and each node mines a block independently with probability p in each round, the number of blocks mined (by νn nodes controlled) by the adversary in each round follows binom(νn, p), which denotes a binomial distribution with νn being the number of trials and p being the success probability for each trial. Then A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) denoting the number of blocks mined the adversary in the T rounds from round t 0 to t 0 + T − 1 is the sum of T indepdendent random variables, each of which obeys binom(νn, p). Hence, A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) follows binom(T νn, p). Then Eq. (27) clearly follows.
We now present the proof Eq. (26), which is quite involved.
In each round, one of the following events will happen: i) H, which means that at least one block is mined by the benign (i.e., honest) nodes, and ii) N , which means that no block is mined by the benign nodes. By a round's state, we refer to whether H or N happens, and we know from the definitions of α and α in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) that H (resp., N ) happens with probability α (resp., α). Then we define State-Set to characterize the possible values that a round's state can take:
Let S t be the random variable representing the state at round t. We will use s t ∈ State-Set as an instantiation of S t .
We consider a Markov chain C F for the suffix of all the states in all rounds up to round t, where "F " means suffix. We will explain that Figure 2 can represent this Markov chain. To avoid confusion, we use "F " instead of "S" since the symbol S is used to represent the state at a round. We will call C F as the suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain. At round t, let random variable F t represent the suffix of the states in all rounds up to round t; i.e., F t represents the vertex visited at round t in the Markov chain C F .
After at least two H have happened by round t (which holds for sufficiently large t), we will explain below that we can characterize all possible F t by the following 2∆+1 values which form the Suffix-Set:
In (29), the term N ≤∆−1 means a series of N which has at most ∆ − 1 number of consecutive N ; i.e., zero N (i.e., null), one N , . . ., or ∆ − 1 number of N . Similarly, N ≥∆ means a series of N which has at least ∆ number of consecutive N , while N a (resp., N b ) means a (resp., b) number of consecutive N . Supposing ∆ = 3 for the purpose of giving an example (practical ∆ is much larger) and the states from round 1 to round 10 are H, N, H, H, N, N, H, N, N, N To see why we can characterize all possible F t by (29), we discuss the following cases, where we recall that S i represents the state at round i:
• If S t is H and S t−1 is H, then we can set F t as HN ≤∆−1 H which covers HH when "N ≤∆−1 " becomes 0 number of N (i.e., null); • If S t is H and S t−1 is N , as we consider that at least two H have happened by round t (which holds for sufficiently large t), suppose the previous H closest to round t happens at round t − c for some c > 0. In other words, S t−c and S t are H while S i for each i ∈ {t − c + 1, . . . , t − 1} is N so that the series S t−c . . . S t can be written as HN c−1 H. 
In Figure 2 on Page 6, we plot the transition of F t in the suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain C F , which is time-homogeneous, irreducible, and ergodic. In particular, from [6] , [18] , time-homogeneous means that the transition does not depend on the time; irreducible means getting to any state from any other state has non-zero probability; and ergodic means that each state has a positive mean recurrence time and is aperiodic (i.e., the period is 1). Figure 2 , the transition rules in the Markov chain C F are as follows:
As illustrated in
① First, for any a ∈ {1, . . . , ∆ − 1}, the event that F t at time t is HN ≤∆−1 HN a can only result from that F t−1 at time t − 1 is HN ≤∆−1 HN a−1 , which by a recursive argument can only result from that F t−a at time t − a is HN ≤∆−1 H. Moreover, moving from F t−a = HN ≤∆−1 H to F t = HN ≤∆−1 HN a requires that S i for each i ∈ {t − a + 1, . . . , t} is N . ② Second, for any b ∈ {0, . . . , ∆ − 1}, the event that F t at time t is HN ≥∆ HN b can only result from that F t−1 at time t − 1 is HN ≥∆ HN b−1 , which by a recursive argument can only result from that F t−b at time t − b is HN ≥∆ H, and also F t−b−1 at time t − b − 1 is HN ≥∆ . Moreover, moving from F t−b−1 = HN ≥∆ to F t = HN ≥∆ HN b requires that S t−a is H, and also S i for each i ∈ {t − a + 1, . . . , t} is N . ③ Third, the event that F t at time t is HN ≤∆−1 H can result from the combination of the following two events: i)
. . , ∆ − 1}; and ii) S t is H. ④ Fourth, the event that F t at time t is HN ≥∆ can result from the combination of the following two events: i) F t−1 at time t − 1 is HN ≥∆ or HN ≤∆−1 HN ∆−1 or HN ≥∆ HN ∆−1 ; and ii) S t is N .
We now derive the stationary distribution of the suffix-ofprevious-and-current-states Markov chain C F . To this end, we first analyze the state transition in C F . Let s t be f t 's state in round t. We define a function suffix(·) such that F t−1 = f t−1 ∩ (S t = s t ) produces F t = suffix(f t−1 ||s t ). Then we have
where the last step uses the independence between F t−1 = f t−1 and (S t = s t ).
Based on Eq. (30), we now set f t as each vertex of Markov chain C F to obtain the specific transition rules.
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN ≤∆−1 HN a . We obtain from Eq. (30) and the above result ① that for any a ∈ {1, . . . , ∆ − 1},
where the last step uses
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN ≥∆ HN b . We obtain from Eq. (30) and the above result ② that for any b ∈ {0, . . . , ∆ − 1},
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN ≤∆−1 H. We obtain from Eq. (30) and the above result ③ that
where the last step uses P [S t = H] = α.
Case of f t in Eq. (30) being HN ≥∆ . We obtain from Eq. (30) and the above result ④ that
Below we analyze the stationary distribution of the Markov chain C F . For f ∈ Suffix-Set, we let π F (f ) be the stationary probability of vertex f , where Suffix-Set is given by Eq. (29); i.e.,
Summarizing Eq. (31)-(34), to derive Markov chain C F 's stationary distribution denoted by π F , we obtain
where Eq. (36a)-(36d) are from Eq. (31)-(34), respectively, and Eq. (36e) simply means that the stationary probabilities of all the states sum to 1.
From Eq. (36a)-(36e), we derive that
We now use the suffix-of-previous-and-current-states Markov chain C F to construct another Markov chain. For notational purpose, we let P stand for S t−∆ . . . S t , which are states in the previous ∆ rounds and the state in the current round t. Then we consider a Markov chain to represent the transition of F t−∆−1 S t−∆ . . . S t , and denote this Markov chain by C F ||P , where "||" intuitively means concatenation. The random variable F t−∆−1 represents the suffix of the states in all rounds up to round t − ∆ − 1, so F t−∆−1 S t−∆ . . . S t means the concatenation of i) the suffix of previous states before the ∆ to last state, ii) the previous ∆ states, and iii) the current state. We can see that the Markov chain C F ||P is time-homogeneous, irreducible, and ergodic.
As it will become clear, to analyze S t of F t−∆−1 S t−∆ . . . S t , knowing whether S t is H or N is not enough, and we need to know the exact number of blocks mined by the honest nodes at round t in the case of S t being H (i.e., when at least one block is mined by the honest nodes at round t). To this end, we let H h be the event that the honest nodes mine h number of block at round t. Then the values that S t can take is given by the following set:
Clearly, the H state comprises all H h states for 1 ≤ h ≤ µn.
Below we analyze the stationary distribution of the Markov chain C F ||P . For f ∈ Suffix-Set, s
(1) ∈ Detailed-State-Set, . . ., s (∆+1) ∈ Detailed-State-Set, we let π F ||P (f s (1) . . . s (∆+1) ) be the stationary probability of vertex f s (1) . . . s (∆+1) , where Suffix-Set and Detailed-State-Set are given by Eq. (38) and (29); i.e.,
, we obtain from Eq. (35) and (39) that
We can also prove Eq. (40) by analyzing the Markov chain C F ||P directly. A proof is deferred to Appendix J.
From Eq. (40), we can compute the stationary distribution π F ||P of the Markov chain C F ||P using expressions of π F in Eq. (37a)-(37d) and the following Eq. (41):
Eq. (41) follows from the result that since each honest node mines a block independently with probability p in a round, the number of blocks mined by the µn honest nodes in each round follows binom(µn, p), which denotes a binomial distribution with µn being the number of trials and p being the success probability for each trial.
We now explain that when we have f = HN ≥∆ ∩ s
, which we write as HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ for notational simplicity, represents a convergence opportunity. Specifically, the pattern of HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ means the following consecutive events: i) a benign node mines a block in a round, ii) at least ∆ rounds pass in which no benign node mines a block, which means that at the end of the ∆ rounds, all benign nodes know all benign blocks and hence agree on the maximum length of the chain (they may not agree on the same chain), iii) a benign node mines a block B in a new round and thus extends a chain by one more block than the longest chain of the previous round, and iv) ∆ rounds pass in which no benign node mines a block.
Therefore, at the end, all honest miners know the new block B and agree on the single longest chain as the one having B.
Then we compute the stationary probability of the F ||P state f s (1) . . . s (∆+1) state being HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ as follows by using Eq. (40):
From Eq. (41), it holds that
From Eq. (37c) and Eq. (43), we obtain
We define f t as the indicator function that the visited vertex at time t is the state HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ . For the T -step random walk on the Markov chain C F ||P in the T rounds from round t 0 to t 0 + T − 1, let the visited vertices be V t0 , . . . , V t0+T −1 . Then from Eq. (44), we have that for t ∈ {t 0 , . . . , t 0 + T − 1}:
• f t (V t ) equals 1 if V t is the state HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ , which happens with probability α 2∆ α 1 ; • f t (V t ) equals 0 if V t is not the state HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ , which happens with probability 1 − α 2∆ α 1 .
Then the expectation of the binary variable
With C(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) being the number of times that HN ≥∆ ||H 1 N ∆ is visited (i.e., the number of convergence opportunities) in the T rounds from round t 0 to t 0 + T − 1, we have
From the above discussion, the random variables
are identically distributed, but are not independent. Since the linearity of expectation holds regardless of whether the random variables are independent, we use Eq. (45) to obtain
i.e., Eq. (26) is proved.
Using Eq. (26) and Eq. (27) which we have both shown, we know that Inequality (10) is the same as Inequality (18) .
In the next subsection, we will show that C(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) is in fact concentrated around its expectation with high probability.
B. Proving Inequality (19)
Recall from the previous subsection that the T -step random walk on the Markov chain C F ||P in the T rounds from round t 0 to t 0 + T − 1 visits vertices V t0 , . . . , V t0+T −1 . Let φ be the initial distribution of the random walk; i.e., φ represents the distribution at round t 0 . Also recall that the Markov chain C F ||P is time-homogeneous, irreducible, and ergodic. Let τ (ǫ, α, ∆) be the ǫ-mixing time of C F ||P , for 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/8. With f t (V t ) and C(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) defined above, we use Theorem 3.1 of Reference [19] on the Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds for Markov chains to obtain the existence of a positive constant c independent of T, n, p, µ, ∆ such that
where φ π , denoting the π-norm of the vector φ, is given by
where Domain(F ||P ) := Suffix-Set×(Detailed-State-Set)
∆+1
since Markov chain C F ||P represents the transition of F t−∆−1 S t−∆ . . . S t . The term T α 2∆ α 1 in Inequality (47) comes from Eq. (26). We can also use Theorem 3.1 of Reference [19] to compute a bound for the tail probability
We do not present the result here since it is not needed.
Proposition 1 below provides an upper bound for φ π .
, where min π F ||P denotes the minimal value among π F ||P and is given by α · α
We prove Proposition 1 in Appendix A.
From Proposition 1, φ π is upper bounded by a term that depends on α and ∆ (note that when α is given, α := 1 − α is also given). Also, τ (ǫ, α, ∆) denoting the ǫ-mixing time of the Markov chain C F ||P is clearly a non-increasing function of ǫ given α and ∆. In view of 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/8, we can select ǫ as 1/8 so that the bound in the right hand side of Inequality (47) is maximized. Then τ (1/8, α, ∆) depends on only α and ∆. Recall from Eq. (7) that α depends on n, p, µ. Hence, given n, p, µ, ∆, we use Inequality (47) to obtain the desired result (19) 
C. Proving Inequality (20)
As already explained in Section V-A, A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) follows the binomial distribution binom(T νn, p). From [20] , for a positive constant δ 3 , with D ((1 + δ 3 )p||p) denoting the relative entropy between a Bernoulli distribution of parameter (1 + δ 3 )p and a Bernoulli distribution of parameter p; i.e., defining
we have
Thus, given n, p, ν, we obtain the desired result (20) that
, where O(1) is with respect to T .
D. Putting things together to prove Theorem 1
We have proved in Section V-A that Inequality (10) as a condition of Theorem 1 is the same as Inequality (18) . Also, Eq. (27) in Section V-A shows that A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) can be written as Ω(T ). We have proved Inequalities (19) and (20) in Sections V-B and V-C. Then we combine (25) and Inequalities (18) (19) (20) with the above A(t 0 , t 0 + T − 1) = Ω(T ) to complete proving Theorem 1.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 GIVEN THEOREM 1
We decompose Inequality (11) of Theorem 2 into Inequalities (50) and (51), to present Theorem 3 below.
Theorem 3. Consistency of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol holds in a window of T rounds with probability at least 1 − O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )), when there exist constants ǫ 1 and ǫ 2 satisfying 0 < ǫ 1 < 1 and ǫ 2 > 0 such that we have
and c denoting
Since c denotes 1 pn∆ , it is straightforward to show that a combination of Inequalities (50) and (51) is the same as Inequality (11), which is a condition of Theorem 2.
Section VI-A below presents the proof of Theorem 3 using Theorem 1. In Section VI-B, we use Theorem 3 to show Theorem 2.
A. Proof of Theorem 3 using Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 3 based on Theorem 1, we will show that given Inequality (50), Inequality (51) implies Inequality (10) . To this end, we analyze Inequality (10) through a series of transformations. Before stating the transformations, we note that in the rest of the paper, "⇐=", "=⇒", and "⇐⇒" represent "is implied by", "implies", and "is equivalent to", respectively. To prove Theorem 3, we will convert Inequality (10) in a number of steps and obtain the following results, where we will explain soon how to set δ 1 and δ 4 .
Nakamoto's blockchain protocol satisfies consistency
Lemma 3
The statements of Lemmas 2-8 used above are deferred to the end of this subsection for clarity, while their proofs will be presented in the Appendix.
Lemmas 2-8 also involve extra conditions on pn, δ 1 , and δ 4 , which are not explicitly stated in (52)-(59). We will show on Page 12 that these conditions on pn are implied by Inequality (50) of Theorem 3. To satisfy conditions on δ 1 and δ 4 in Lemmas 2-8 for proving Theorem 3 (the conditions will be discussed in detail on Page 12), we will set δ 4 and δ 1 as follows:
, and (60)
We note that δ 4 and δ 1 in Eq. (60) and Eq. (61) are both positive for 0 < ǫ 1 < 1 and ǫ 2 > 0. Clearly, δ 4 > 0 since the nominator and denominator of Eq. (60) are both positive. In addition, given
Below, we give intuitive explanations for a) how we obtain the condition on pn in Inequality (50) of Theorem 3, and b) why we set δ 4 and δ 1 according to Eq. (60) and (61) in order to have (52)-(59) get through. The explanations are just intuitive since some steps come from necessity arguments while some other steps result from sufficiency arguments. On Page 12, we will formally explain that enforcing the condition on pn in Inequality (50) and setting constants δ 4 and δ 1 according to Eq. (60) and (61) will ensure that all conditions of Lemmas 2-8 are satisfied.
How do we obtain the condition on pn in Inequality (50) of Theorem 3?
In (57) and (58), we observe the expression ln 
This Inequality (64) is stronger than pn < 1 µ used in Lemma 2. Hence, our condition on pn is just Inequality (64), which is exactly Inequality (50) of Theorem 3.
How do we set constants δ 4 and δ 1 according to Eq. (60) and (61) to have (52)-(59) get through?
As discussed above, from (54), we see that Lemma 3 is used to provide We now state Lemmas 2-8, which are proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Under
then Inequality (10) 
and δ 1 given by
we have δ 4 > 0, δ 1 > 0, and
Remark 3. Inequality (70) means that under
Inequality (66) of Lemma 2 follows. Thus, under (50) and (68), we have Inequality (66) Lemma 3 ⇐==== Inequality (71).
Lemma 4. Under
if c denoting 1 pn∆ satisfies c ≥ 1 
Lemma 5. Under Inequality (73), we have µ
where the denominators in both sides of Inequality (76) are positive from Proposition 2 above. 
Remark 7. Inequality (79) means that if c denoting Lemma 6 ⇐==== Inequality (80).
(81) (ln µ ν +1)µ ) with 0 < ǫ 1 < 1 and ǫ 2 > 0 from Theorem 3. To this end, we have the following:
• We obtain Inequality (65) from Inequality (50) with
• After we define δ 4 according to (60), we obtain Inequality (68) in view of (62), and obtain Inequality (73) in view of
Summarizing the above, we have shown Theorem 3 using (67) (72) (75) (78) (81) (84) (86), which hold respectively after we prove Lemmas 2-8 in Appendices B-I.
B. Using Theorem 3 to prove Theorem 2
For c denoting 1 pn∆ , it is straightforward to show that a combination of Inequalities (50) and (51) in Theorem 3 is the same as Inequality (11) of Theorem 2. Hence, given Theorem 3, we know that if Inequality (11) holds, then the consistency of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol holds in a window of T rounds with probability at least 1 − O(1) · exp (−Ω (T )).
To complete the proof of Theorem 2, next we show that under Inequality (12), we can write Inequality (11) as Inequality (13) . of Inequality (12), we have
From µ = 1 − ν and the condition ν ≤ 1 1+exp
Inequality (12), we have
which implies
Here we set ǫ 1 by
From (87) (89) (90) and the condition δ 1 + δ 2 < 1, letting ǫ 1 be ∆ δ1+δ2−1 , we obtain 2µ ln
which means that Inequality (11) (i.e., c ≥ max
From (89) and µ > 1 2 , we get
which means that a sufficient condition for (92) is
where the last step uses (90).
The above result (94) gives Inequality (13) . Hence, we have completed proving Theorem 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the consistency of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol. Let µ (resp., ν) be the fraction of computational power controlled by benign miners (resp., the adversary), where µ + ν = 1. With c denoting the expected number of network delays before some block is mined, we prove for the first time that to ensure the consistency property of Nakamoto's blockchain protocol in an asynchronous network, it suffices to have c to be just slightly greater than 2µ ln(µ/ν) . This expression is both neater and stronger than existing ones. In the proof, we formulate novel Markov chains which characterize the numbers of mined blocks in different rounds.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Proposition 1
The π-norm of φ is
where min π F ||P denotes the minimal value among π F ||P .
Recall from Eq. (40) that where the minimal value among π F is
Combining (95) (98) (99), we complete proving Proposition 1.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Recall the expression of α 1 in Inequality (43); i.e., α 1 = pµn × (1 − p) µn−1 . Then given the condition 0 < pµn < 1 and the result µn − 1 > 
Then Inequality (100) induces
The statement pµn (1 − pµn) α 2∆ ≥ (1+δ 1 )pνn is equivalent to α ≥ 
F. Proof of Lemma 5
First, we know from Proposition 2 that the denominators in both sides of Inequality (76) of Lemma 5 are positive.
With A defined by
we know A > 0 from Proposition 2. Also, clearly A < 1. With 0 < A < 1 and µn > 
We plug Eq. (104) (i.e., the expression of A) into (105) and complete proving Lemma 5.
G. Proof of Lemma 6
We evaluate 
Thus, Lemma 8 is proved. has the same rule as the transition from π F (f t−∆−2 ) to π F (f t−∆−1 ), so we can conclude = π F (f t−∆−1 ), which is exactly the desired result Eq. (40).
J. Proof of Eq. (40)
P
